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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Vaughn Johnson challenges a judgment 
revoking his term of supervised release and resentencing him 
to 18 months in prison (with credit for time served).  He 
contends, among other things, that the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands lacked jurisdiction over the term of supervised 
release, because 1) he was subject to a previous revocation 
order, entered by a different district court, on an unrelated 
concurrent supervised release term; and 2) the Virgin Islands 
Probation Office failed to actually supervise him or attempt to 
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do so.  As we find that the District Court was not deprived of 
jurisdiction, we will affirm.  
I. 
In the early 2010s, Johnson was twice convicted of 
federal crimes.  The first conviction, in the Middle District of 
Florida, arose from a charge of lying on a passport 
application.  The second, in the District of the Virgin Islands, 
arose from wire fraud charges.  In both instances, Johnson 
received a custodial sentence followed by three years of 
supervised release, the conditions of which would be violated 
if he committed another crime.1  Because Johnson was 
already imprisoned on the first charge when he was indicted, 
convicted, and sentenced on the second, he effectively served 
one aggregate prison term in connection with both 
convictions. 
After Johnson was released from prison in January 
2014, he settled in the Middle District of Florida, and the 
Middle District’s Probation Office took charge of his 
supervision.  Aside from a brief status phone call in June 
2014 that he initiated, Johnson had no contact with the Virgin 
Islands Probation Office, which otherwise took no action to 
supervise or keep tabs on him. 
In January 2015, Johnson was again indicted in Florida 
federal court for lying on a passport application—a charge to 
                                       
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (“The court shall order, as an 
explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant not 
commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term 
of supervision . . . .”). 
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which he would eventually plead guilty, but which also 
violated the no-new-crime condition of his supervised release 
terms.  As a result, the Middle District of Florida began 
taking steps to revoke the Florida term of supervised release 
by issuing an order of detention.  Johnson eventually admitted 
the Middle District revocation charge and, in April 2016, the 
district court entered a judgment of revocation sentencing him 
to time served. 
Although the new Florida federal indictment had been 
handed down in January 2015, the Virgin Islands Probation 
Office took no action until March 2016, when it was belatedly 
informed by its Middle District of Florida counterpart of 
Johnson’s new indictment and, by extension, of his violation 
of the conditions of the Virgin Islands term of supervised 
release.  After inquiring into whether the Middle District of 
Florida Probation Office would accept a formal transfer of 
jurisdiction (Florida declined), the Virgin Islands Probation 
Office notified the Virgin Islands District Court of Johnson’s 
violation.  The Court then began the formal process of 
revoking Johnson’s Virgin Islands term of supervised release.  
This time, however, Johnson decided to challenge the 
revocation proceedings.  He did so partly on jurisdictional 
grounds, arguing that the Florida district court’s judgment of 
revocation had eliminated the Virgin Islands term of 
supervised release, leaving nothing left to supervise or 
revoke.  He claimed also that the Virgin Islands Probation 
Office’s abdication of its supervisory responsibility—as 
demonstrated by its failure to supervise or attempt to 
supervise between his release from prison and March 2016—
otherwise deprived the District Court of jurisdiction.   
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After conducting a revocation hearing,2 the District 
Court overruled Johnson’s challenges, denied his oral motion 
to dismiss, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him 
to 18 months in prison (with credit for time served) and 18 
additional months of supervised release.  Johnson appealed. 
II.3 
a) Jurisdictional Arguments 
1) Merger of Concurrent Terms of Supervised 
Release 
Johnson’s first argument is that the two concurrent 
                                       
2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2).  
3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to determine, 
among other things, whether the District Court properly 
exercised its own jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3241 and 
3583(e).  Johnson has been released from prison, but as the 
separate term of supervised release contained in the 
revocation judgment is not “over, and can[] be undone” if he 
prevails, this appeal is not moot.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 
1, 8 (1998).  Our review of questions of law, jurisdictional or 
otherwise, is plenary.  See United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 
79, 82 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that, in a supervised release 
appeal, “review of jurisdictional issues is plenary”); United 
States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
United States v. Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (“We review de novo whether the district court 
had jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release.”). 
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terms of supervised release, from Florida and the Virgin 
Islands, were effectively terminated by the Middle District of 
Florida’s single revocation judgment.  He relies in part on 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(e), the subsection of the “Release of a 
prisoner” statute pertaining to “Supervision After Release.”  
Johnson points out that from a logical standpoint, a single 
Probation Office operating out of a single judicial district will 
have the actual duty of supervision, as a person will not 
generally reside in two separate districts at the same time.  
Johnson therefore argues that “where multiple terms of 
supervised release run concurrently, revocation of one such 
term necessarily terminates the concurrent terms . . . because 
Congress effectively determined that an offender should serve 
only one term of post-release supervision.”4  In effect, 
Johnson proposes a de facto merger of concurrent supervised 
release terms, combining the practical reality of single-district 
supervision with the legal consequences of committing a 
violation.  A single revocation judgment would, in this model, 
wipe out all concurrent supervised release terms then 
pending. 
As Johnson seems to concede, however, the two 
Courts of Appeals that have addressed an analogous argument 
in their published decisions—the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
in United States v. Gammarano and United States v. 
Alvarado—have rejected it.5  Johnson did not explain either 
                                       
4 Appellant’s Br. at 11.  
5 See United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 314 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“Nothing in the text of § 3624(e), or any other 
statute, indicates that the revocation of one term of supervised 
release necessarily terminates another term of supervision 
simply because it runs concurrently with the term being 
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in his brief or at oral argument why he thinks these cases 
were wrongly decided.  Our own case law, moreover, rejects 
his argument by implication.  In United States v. Dees, we 
joined six other circuits in permitting consecutive prison 
terms to be imposed when concurrent terms of supervised 
release are revoked, even if the revocations are all based on 
the same underlying violation conduct6—an outcome that 
depends on the viability of multiple, independent terms of 
supervised release.   
Nevertheless, we begin with the language of the statute 
upon which Johnson bases his argument, § 3624(e), which 
addresses the mechanics of supervised release terms—setting 
out when they begin, when they are tolled, and how 
supervision is transferred between the Bureau of Prisons (a 
part of the Department of Justice) and the Probation Office (a 
part of the federal court system).  Section 3624(e) says a term 
                                                                                      
revoked . . . .  Accordingly, we hold that revocation of a term 
of supervised release for one conviction does not terminate 
supervised release imposed as a result of a separate 
conviction.”); United States v. Alvarado, 201 F.3d 379, 381–
82 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the revocation of one term of 
supervised release did not “automatically terminate” another); 
see also United States v. Mittelstadt, 88 F. App’x 128, 129–
30 (7th Cir. 2004) (nonprecedential per curiam order) (“We 
see no reason why the district court could not have revoked 
one term of supervised release but not the other . . . .”); 
McGaughey v. United States, 596 F.2d 796, 797–98 (8th Cir. 
1979) (per curiam) (reaching a similar outcome in the context 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and via summary affirmance).   
6 467 F.3d 847, 851–52 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Case: 16-3268     Document: 003112663908     Page: 7      Date Filed: 06/30/2017
8 
 
of supervised release “commences on the day the person is 
released from imprisonment,” which is when a prisoner is 
“released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a 
probation officer who shall, during the term imposed, 
supervise the person released to the degree warranted by the 
conditions specified by the sentencing court.”  The term of 
supervised release then “runs concurrently with any Federal, 
State, or local term of probation or supervised release or 
parole for another offense to which the person is subject or 
becomes subject during the term of supervised release.”   
In our view, nothing in the language of § 3624(e) 
supports Johnson’s claim that Congress “effectively 
determined” that a prisoner would be subject to only a single 
de facto, amalgam term of supervised release.  To the 
contrary, the statute specifically acknowledges that a 
supervised release term is to be concurrent with other federal 
and state probationary or parole periods, including another 
federal term of supervised release; or, as we said in Dees,  
“[§] 3624(e) mandates that multiple terms of supervised 
release run concurrently.”7  Section 3624(e) does use the 
singular throughout—“the term,” not “the terms,” overseen 
by “a” probation officer—but we think this is because it is 
written to address individual terms of supervised release, in 
line with other parts of the statutory framework.8  We do not 
read that drafting choice, or the statute more broadly, to 
bolster Johnson’s merger argument.  
                                       
7 Id. at 851.  
8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (setting forth how a court may 
terminate, extend, or revoke “a term” of supervised release).   
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We gain further support for our decision by reference 
to the relevant federal probation statute.  In the federal 
system, probation differs from supervised release in that it is 
imposed as an alternative to prison rather than in addition to 
prison.9  Otherwise, federal probation is governed by the 
same basic mechanics as supervised release and is subject to 
the same logistical realities regarding multiple terms of 
supervision that Johnson has identified.10  The analogous 
probation statute is § 3564, which is entitled “Running of a 
term of probation.”  Its subsection (b) specifically 
acknowledges “[m]ultiple terms of probation,” which 
“whether imposed at the same time or at different times” are 
to “run concurrently with each other.”  Thus, far from 
demonstrating a congressional intent to bring about a merger 
of probation terms, § 3564(b) indicates the opposite.  It is 
therefore unlikely that probation and supervised release were 
intended to function differently from each other on such a 
basic level.    
More broadly, in cases such as this one where multiple 
terms of supervised release arise out of judgments entered in 
different judicial districts, Johnson’s merger argument would 
                                       
9 See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 
2007); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 n.* (4th 
Cir. 1992) (“Supervised release and probation differ only in 
that the former follows a prison term and the latter is in lieu 
of a prison term.”). 
10 See United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 
2002) (discussing similarities between probation and 
supervised release); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 
(“Revoking or Modifying Probation or Supervised Release.”).  
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violate the general modern rule that a court lacks jurisdiction 
to modify a criminal judgment from another district.11  And as 
§ 3583(a) establishes, supervised release is as much a “part of 
the sentence” as a term of imprisonment or a fine.  We see no 
reason, and Johnson does not advance any, to treat the power 
to modify or revoke a term of supervised release any 
differently than we would the power to modify any other 
aspects of a criminal judgment.  This is especially so in light 
of 1) the inclusion in the statutory framework of an explicit 
mechanism for transferring supervised release jurisdiction 
among judicial districts, and which allows the transferee 
district to step into the shoes of the original sentencing 
court12; and 2) the plentiful jurisdictional language in Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32.1, such as its distinction between “Appearance in 
the District With Jurisdiction” and the same in “a District 
Lacking Jurisdiction.”13  Were Johnson correct, this clear 
jurisdictional language would be rendered superfluous when, 
as here, a person was subject to more than one term of 
                                       
11 For instance, federal law generally directs that filings 
attacking the validity or length of a conviction or sentence be 
made in the sentencing court.  See, e.g., In re Nwanze, 242 
F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily a petitioner 
should present [an attack on a conviction] to the sentencing 
court rather than the court in the district in which he is 
confined.”). 
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3605; cf. United States v. Adams, 723 F.3d 
687, 689 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that “§ 3605 authorizes a 
transferee court to revoke a term of a defendant’s supervised 
release for violations committed prior to the transfer of 
jurisdiction”). 
13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(4), (5).   
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supervised release from more than one judicial district.   
For the above reasons, we join the Second and Fifth 
Circuits in rejecting the model of merged terms of supervised 
release.14  As a result, we conclude that the Virgin Islands 
term of supervised release was not constructively discharged 
by the Middle District of Florida’s separate judgment of 
revocation.  In fact, even if the Middle District of Florida had 
intended to act on Johnson’s Virgin Islands term of 
supervised release—and there is no indication that it did—the 
court would have been without jurisdiction to do so, absent a 
formal § 3605 transfer of jurisdiction from the Virgin Islands.  
2) Failure to Actually Supervise 
Johnson’s second jurisdictional argument also relies on 
§ 3624(e).  Pointing to the mandatory language of the 
statute—a Probation Officer “shall . . . supervise the person 
released”—he alleges that the Virgin Islands District Court 
lacked jurisdiction because its Probation Office “failed to 
supervise or even attempt to supervise [him],” thereby 
                                       
14 We are otherwise unconvinced by Johnson’s rule-of-lenity 
and reliance arguments.  The statutes are not ambiguous, see 
United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 340 (3d Cir. 
2014), and Johnson does not explain how his “assumption” 
that his supervision was transferred to Florida has any legal 
significance.  To the extent that Johnson intends to argue that 
his incorrect assumption led him to take a legal stance in the 
Florida revocation that would have prejudiced him on res 
judicata grounds, we do not assign such an argument any 
jurisdictional significance.   
Case: 16-3268     Document: 003112663908     Page: 11      Date Filed: 06/30/2017
12 
 
abdicating its statutory responsibility to do so.15   
At the outset, we do not agree with Johnson that 
§ 3624(e) conditions jurisdiction to revoke on actual 
supervision by a particular Probation Office.  Otherwise, a 
court would be deprived of jurisdiction if a person committed 
a violation after being released from prison but before 
reporting, or while AWOL, or while traveling within another 
judicial district.   
Johnson suggests that the relevant distinction is 
between action and inaction, but we are not so sure; § 3624(e) 
does not otherwise speak in clear jurisdictional language16 
and says nothing about “attempts” to supervise.  And while 
Probation Officers play an essential role in supervision, they 
are not the ultimate decision-makers in the context of 
supervised release.  Rather, the judgment is overseen by the 
district court itself.17  We will not cut short the district court’s 
jurisdiction upon the Probation Office’s failure to fulfill its 
statutory responsibilities.  
Further, based on the logistical hurdles to actual multi-
district supervision previously mentioned, the Virgin Islands 
Probation Office would have been functionally unable to 
                                       
15 Appellant’s Br. at 15.  
16 See Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 
810 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining the presumption 
against interpreting statutory language as jurisdictional).  
17 Cf. United States v. Hollins, 847 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 
2017) (addressing the authority of Probation Officers to 
render advice for the ultimate review of the district court). 
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supervise Johnson so long as he remained in Florida.  As the 
District Court observed during the revocation hearing, even if 
the Virgin Islands Probation Office had “attempted” to 
supervise Johnson, or had engaged in a semiformal “courtesy 
supervision”18 arrangement with the Middle District of 
                                       
18 Johnson argues, in part, that “courtesy supervision”—an 
informal arrangement between Probation Offices that does 
not transfer jurisdiction, but instead uses the supervising 
office as the “eyes and ears” of another—is not authorized by 
law.  See Appellant’s Br. at 12.  According to the Guide to 
Judiciary Policy, however, courtesy supervision finds its 
statutory basis in 18 U.S.C. § 3603(4), which instructs 
probation officers to “be responsible for the supervision of 
any probationer or a person on supervised release who is 
known to be within the judicial district.”  See 8E Guide to 
Judiciary Policy § 375.10 (Apr. 17, 2014) (setting forth 
statutory bases for short-term courtesy supervision and 
longer-term “transfer of supervision” without transfer of 
jurisdiction).  While we need not determine whether courtesy 
supervision for longer durations comports with the “brief 
period[s] of time” set forth in the Guide, see id., we do note 
that courtesy supervision exposes another flaw in Johnson’s 
jurisdictional argument.  If Johnson were instead serving a 
Florida state term of supervised release or probation, a formal 
transfer of jurisdiction to Florida would have been 
impossible, as § 3605 authorizes transfer between federal 
district courts only.  As a result, if Johnson were correct about 
the jurisdictional nature of actual or attempted supervision, a 
federal term of probation or supervised release could become 
a nullity whenever a state probationary term was actually 
being served.   
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Florida, the result would have been the same: actual 
supervision by the Middle District of Florida.19   
Accordingly, we reject this jurisdictional challenge.20  
b) Violation of Due Process 
In his final (and only non-jurisdictional) argument, 
Johnson contends that the District Court erred by relying on 
two documents the Court had independently obtained from 
the Middle District of Florida Probation Office.  In so doing, 
Johnson asserts, the District Court denied his Due Process 
right to a neutral and detached arbiter by assuming the role of 
an advocate for the government. 
                                       
19 On that point, we note that the Judicial Conference has long 
encouraged district courts to transfer undischarged supervised 
release terms to the actual district of supervision, voting in 
1988 to “encourage courts mutually to consent to such 
transfers as provided by 18 U.S.C. [§] 3605.”  Report of the 
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
13 (Mar. 15, 1988).  The Guide to Judiciary Policy also 
continues to recognize the advantages of “simultaneous 
transfer of jurisdiction in all instances when an offender is 
being supervised in another district.”  8E Guide to Judiciary 
Policy § 375(c). 
20 Contrary to what Johnson suggests, our holding does not 
read out of the statute the mandatory responsibilities of the 
Probation Office.  Rather, it simply recognizes the distinction 
between “mandatory” and “jurisdictional.”  See, e.g., 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).  
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This claim fails under any standard of review.21  
Although the documents in question are not part of the record 
on appeal, the hearing transcript indicates that they consisted 
of two letters acquired from the Middle District of Florida 
Probation Office specifying the date of Johnson’s release 
from prison and explaining why he was briefly released in 
Kentucky, topics that had earlier been addressed by the 
Probation Officer’s testimony.  To the extent that the Court’s 
reliance on them violated the “minimal” due process 
protections that apply in revocation proceedings,22 Johnson 
fails to show, or even argue, that this violation led to any 
prejudice.  We do not perceive any on independent review; 
the documents were, at most, relevant to the start date of 
Johnson’s term of supervised release and/or the fact of his 
actual supervision in Florida, neither of which appeared to be 
seriously in dispute (and neither of which is being litigated in 
this appeal).   
III. 
As the District Court had jurisdiction to revoke 
Johnson’s term of supervised release, and did not violate his 
Due Process rights in the course of doing so, we will affirm 
its judgment.  
                                       
21 Johnson does not appear to have raised this as a Due 
Process argument below, but the government nevertheless 
urges plenary review, see Gov’t Br. at 16. 
22 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 489 (1972); see 
also United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 
2008) (explaining that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 incorporates Due 
Process protections).  
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